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Resource Management for Sustainable Development of Island Economies
1 
Majah-Leah Ravago, James Roumasset, and Kimberly Burnett 
 
"Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." 
                -- Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Prior to the release of the famous report “Our Common Future” in 1987, it 
sufficed to define sustainability in consonance with the definition of sustain -- “to keep in 
existence, maintain, prolong.” After the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on 
Environment and Development) was created, a new definition emerged that successfully 
ensconced sustainability in the development arena.  
 
The Commission defined sustainability as, “… development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.” Although this definition is somewhat vague and has been a source of contention, 
concern for sustainability is now manifestly ubiquitous. Governments, private 
organizations, and multilateral institutions strive to pursue economic development that is 
compatible with environmental objectives. As sustainability has become increasingly 
politicized, it is now widely used to refer to a systems approach that incorporates 
environment, economy, and society. The scope of sustainability has become so broad that 
it can include income distribution, gender equity, culture, and a host of other political 
goals of NGO’s and their donors.
2 
 
Immediately following the report, there was an explosion of literature from 
economics, philosophy, and other disciplines, much of which was an attempt to specify 
what sustainable development meant for public policy. In the 1990s, there was a race to 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at The 2nd R&DID International Conference on Global Competitiveness Through 
R&DID on March 3-4, 2008, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
2 See e.g. Hardi and Zdan, 1997.  
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discover a single criterion of sustainable development, and a debate emerged over 
whether  strong or weak sustainability was that criterion.
3   These criteria are now 
recognized as category mistakes. 
 
Returning to the original Brundtland concept, sustainable development must allow 
for the inter-linkages between poverty, population pressure, and the degradation of 
environmental resources. The conclusion reached by the Commission is that the problems 
could be addressed only if these three are taken into account collectively.  Figure 1 
depicts the interaction of population pressure and poverty as the notorious Malthusian 
vicious-circle and environmental degradation, which exacerbates that circle. Population 
growth, in the face of a limited resource base, exacerbates poverty by lowering the return 
to unskilled labor. This in turn prevents mechanisms whereby increased incomes and the 
rising productivity of human capital lower the demand for children. The population-
poverty cycle is exacerbated as households with limited resource-access strive to eke out 
a living from hillsides, wetlands, and other environmentally fragile areas, thus degrading 
the limited natural capital available to the poor.  
 
This paper looks at the issue of managing resources for sustainable development 
of island economies. In particular, we investigate a comparative case of the island 
economies of Hawaii and the Philippines to illustrate the commonalities as well as 
lessons that can be drawn from each other. The next section takes the perspective of the 
resource curse in reviewing unsustainable development practices of these island 
economies.  We discuss how rent seeking deepens fragmentation and economic 
stagnation. This, alongside increasing population, exerts undue pressure on 
environmentally fragile areas. Section III proposes a cure for these ills, a more 
appropriate and meaningful depiction of the three pillars of sustainability. Section IV 
provides specific illustration through the island economies of the Philippines and Hawaii. 
We conclude by exploring ways that the “curse” can be transformed into growth and how 
                                                 
3 In economics, “strong sustainability” prohibits any level of depletion of natural capital such as trees, 
water, or fish, while “weak sustainability” requires the value of produced and natural capital to remain 
constant or increase over time.   
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development, specialization, and innovation can spur growth and thus attain positive 
sustainability. 
 
II.  Nature and Causes of Unsustainable Development: Dutch Disease and the 
Curse of Paradise 
 
Like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, there are many pathways of unsustainable 
development. The first of these – excessive resource depletion and/or pollution is 
illustrated by Repetto and other’s (1989) example of Indonesia in the period between 
1971-1984. Indonesia over-exploited its oil and timber reserves in an unsustainable 
manner. Dynamic efficiency calls for extracting resources in accordance with the 
extended Hotelling rule for renewable resources (Stavins, Wagner, and Wagner 2003; 
Endress et al. 2005). Excess depletion of natural resources results from a failure to align 
private incentives with social priorities, especially through inappropriate or the lack of 
property rights, e.g. the ability of military units to exploit public forests or the 
nationalization of the oil business. 
 
A second type of dynamic inefficiency results from waste through government 
failure regarding public expenditures. Panayotou (1993) illustrated such unsustainable 
development projects with subsidized cattle ranching operations in Brazil that deforested 
a lush stretch of Brazilian Amazon rainforest. Its rapid expansion brought about by 
unsustainable management practices led to pasture degradation which pushed ranchers to 
cut down additional forests in order to keep their herds. Relatively cheaper land prices 
and higher productivity made cattle ranching profitable in the Amazon (Volpi 2007). The 
extensive support the industry received from the government encouraged the industry 
which aggravates the problem of deforestation. The Superintendency for Development of 
Amazonia (SUDAM) was created with the objective of improving the economic 
development of the region. The well-intentioned program provided certain corporations a 
tax credit scheme aimed at promoting live stock ranches in the Amazon. Contrary to 
expectations, this example of an unsustainable development project resulted in rapid  
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deforestation, modest afforestation, commercial failure of ranches, and enormous fiscal 
costs amounting to more than $1 billion US dollars between 1975 and 1986 (Volpi 2007).  
 
Even if dynamic efficiency is satisfied, unsustainable development can result from 
excess consumption relative to investment, such that the accumulation of produced 
capital is too little to offset the depletion of natural capital, i.e. that total capital 
accumulation is negative (Arrow et al. 2004). 
 
Beyond the avoidance of unsustainable development, we still have the question of 
which of the many sustainable development paths to pursue. The optimal sustainable 
development path will still require positive policy reforms and investments due to the 
augmented Malthusian dilemma depicted in figure 1. What are the positive forces of 
sustainable development and how can these be facilitated by government policies?  
 
What do we know about dynamically-efficient macroeconomic development? The 
manufacturing sector of each set of trading countries grows faster than its agricultural 
sector. The service sector grows even faster. Specialization is especially rapid in the 
manufacturing sector.
4  Capital accumulation, comprised of produced, human, and 
knowledge capital, accelerates growth.  During industrialization and service sector 
growth, resource depletion slows, e.g. renewable forestry, bench terraces, fertilizer, 
renewable energy, and imports of non-renewable increase. Natural capital depletion is 
much less than physical and human capital accumulation, even if you add environmental 
degradation to resource depletion.  
 
One illustration of macroeconomic patterns of specialization in the course of 
sustainable development is the coevolution of industrialization ala the flying geese 
metaphor. Formulated by Akamatsu (1962), the flying geese paradigm describes how 
nations align similar to the geese V-formation in different stages of development. As 
wages rise in most developed economies, other countries take over labor-intensive 
                                                 
4Specialization begins in the agricultural sector as Boserup effects (Boserup, 1965, 1981) as a partially 
offsetting effect to Malthusian involution (see Roumasset, 2008).  
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manufacturing for exports. For the East-Asian model, the lead goose is Japan, followed 
by the New Industrializing Economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong. The third layer consists of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, with the Philippines 
and Vietnam tailing behind. The East-Asian Miracle is characterized by a virtuous circle 
of capital intensification and human capital accumulation whereby network externalities 
lead to endogenous growth.  
 
Dutch Disease Mechanics: Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate and Political 
Economy Effects 
 
Most island economies are inherently rich in natural resources. Their tropical 
weather, long stretch of beaches, wealth of marine biodiversity, abundance of tropical 
plants, etc. earned the moniker “island paradise”. Tourism manifests the demand for these 
natural endowments.   A sudden increase in tourism demand is the economic equivalent 
of a resource boom. 
 
How can a resources boom be a curse? The term “resource curse” is commonly 
used to describe countries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and 
gas, but have remained at the bottom of economic development and good governance 
relative to less endowed countries (Auty, 1993). The geographical and geophysical 
characteristics make some island economies qualify as resource. As one would expect, 
their abundance of natural resource capital could serve as impetus for its growth. 
However, progress is laggard if not difficult to sustain in these island economies. Is this 
curse rooted in their natural endowments or in other sources? 
 
Two features incubate the so-called “Dutch disease.”
5  A new resource discovery 
or an exogenous increase in the world price of a country’s primary resource endowment 
increases the real exchange rate, wages and input prices, thereby inhibiting 
industrialization and knocking these economies out of the flock of flying geese. But the 
                                                 
5 The term first appeared in November, 1977 issue of The Economist describing the decline of the 
Netherlands’s manufacturing industry following their discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s.  
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East Asian Miracle (1993) informs us that the external economies of endogenous growth 
theory are especially rich in exportable manufactures -- exactly the sector thereby 
disadvantaged. 
 
 As explained by Corden (1984 and 1982), another aspect of Dutch Disease is 
unproductive rent-seeking. The more the inherent resource wealth, the higher returns to 
lobbying, the greater the lobbying, and the greater the resulting policy distortions. Corden 
gave the example of industrialists adversely impacted by the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate increasing their lobbying effort for tariff and non-tariff protection. For 
island economies, these features apply except that the geographical and geophysical 
characteristics are not physically extracted (e.g. beach, mountains, volcanoes, natural 
landscape, tropical weather). Instead, these natural endowments are degraded by 
improper management. 
 
We adopt Sachs (2007) geometry of Dutch disease that originated from the 
famous Salter (1959) model of non-tradeables. Figure 2 describes how an economy can 
catch the disease.  The model distinguishes between traded and non-traded goods (and 
services). The latter is commonly defined as goods that face high transport cost 
prohibiting trade and typically includes production of food and services for local use. 
Agriculture and manufacturing are classified under traded goods. A discovery of oil 
(Sachs, 2007) or a one-time improvement in technology gives rise to a third sector 
dividing traded goods into non-booming and booming sectors (Corden and Neary, 1982). 
The latter also noted that a windfall discovery of a new resource and an exogenous 
increase in the price of a purely exported product in the world market can cause the 
occurrence of such a boom. 
 
 Likewise, any sudden surge of capital inflows, such as remittances, foreign aid, 
foreign direct investments, earnings from tourism and military bases that create a 
booming trade sector can be analyzed in the Dutch Disease framework. The general 
effect is channeled through the appreciation of the exchange rate where there is an 
increase in the price of non-tradables relative to tradeables, which impoverishes the trade  
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sector. It must be noted that a boom arising from a vibrant tourism industry has unique 
features not present in the other source of boom mentioned above. Tourism converts non-
traded goods and services into tradables by bringing tourists into the country to consume 
these goods. Thus, it has a direct effect in increasing the price of non-tradables thereby 
affecting the real exchange rate (Copeland, 1991). 
 
Figure 2a depicts an economy before the boom occurs. The production possibility 
frontier (PPF) shows all the possible combinations of traded and non-traded goods the 
economy can attain. The tangency between the PPF and the consumer indifference curve 
(II) gives the equilibrium point E and following down the line through horizontal and 
vertical axes gives the level of traded (ET) and non-traded goods (EN), respectively. The 
line RER is the slope of PPF at point E or the relative price of traded goods to non-traded 
goods and is equal to the real exchange rate. It is given by the equation, RER = PT/PN. 
Thus, the steeper the line the more depreciated the currency is. Maintaining the 
assumption of a small open-economy, dollar prices of traded goods are exogenously set 
while dollar prices of non-traded goods adjust to clear supply and demand in the domestic 
market.   
 
A booming sector is created for reasons indicated above which increases the 
output of traded goods shown in Figure 2b. The PPF shifts to the right by the amount of 
the boom, H. Point E* is the new equilibrium with an increase in both traded and non-
traded goods. The former is raised to an amount (E*T + H) but the output of the non-
booming traded sector shrinks to E*T. The slope of the PPF at E* is now less steep 
relative to E -- a real exchange rate appreciation. An appreciation of the currency implies 
an increase in the opportunity cost in the production of traded goods, hence an erosion in 
the competitiveness of traded goods. 
 
The movement from E to E* is brought about by spending and resource 
movement effects (Corden and Neary, 1982). Assuming that non-traded goods are normal 
goods such that income elasticity is positive, if the income generated from the booming 
traded sector is spent (partially or fully) on non-traded goods then the price of the latter  
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increases relative to traded goods. Thus, a real exchange rate appreciation takes place-- a 
spending effect. The resource movement effect involves a direct and indirect de-
industrialization (Corden, 1984).
6 As wages and input prices rise because of the increased 
productivity in the booming sector, they push the mobile factor labor out of the non-
booming traded sector into non-traded sector. This leads to a decline in the output of the 
non-booming traded sector causing a direct de-industrialization. Concomitantly, a 
movement of the mobile factor out of the non-traded sector into the booming traded 
sector boosts the price of the former.  This reinforces the appreciation of RER brought 
about by the spending effect. This dynamic bolsters the resource movement effect from 
the non-booming traded sector into the non-traded sector causing an indirect de-
industrialization.   
 
The Returns to Rent-Seeking in Resource-Rich Economies 
 
In island economies, rent seeking is stronger because the conferred economic rent 
is greater.  Figure 3 shows the famous iron triangle which exemplifies this stronger rent 
seeking.
7  The politicians sitting at the apex of the triangle form alliances with the 
bureaucrats who share the same intention of broadening and fortifying their power base. 
Support from the member of the citizenry is needed to justify their existence. However, 
the citizenry is divided into organized and disorganized groups. Although the citizenry 
comprises the majority, its interests are diffuse and organizational costs large. 
 
On the other hand, small special interest groups have more sharply focused 
objectives and ease of organization (Olson 1982 and Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). 
Furthermore, their participation in political affairs creates a solid electoral support that 
politicians seek. Meanwhile, the special interest groups intentionally cultivate the 
alliances of politicians and bureaucrats to further their own private agenda and protect 
their own businesses. Their partnership with bureaucrats allows them to enjoy lax 
regulations and special favors while the politicians can influence the legal environment 
                                                 
6 See Corden (1984) for a detailed discussion on de-industrialization. 
7 See e.g. Lowi, 1979.  
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conducive for expansion and profitability of their business. The reinforcing arrows make 
it an invincible iron triangle. With these dynamics, the minority of special interests 
readily tyrannizes the needs of the relatively poor majority. 
  
III. The Cure for Unsustainable Development 
 
Three pillars of sustainability 
 
The proposed cure for these ills is the “three pillars of sustainability” as 
articulated by Nobel Laureates Robert Solow, Kenneth Arrow, and Amartya Sen, 
Harvard’s Robert Stavins and many others. These are:  1) Interlinkages, especially 
between natural resource systems, the environment and the economy; 2) Dynamic 
efficiency, especially regarding conservation  of  resources  and  the  environment;  and         
3) Intertemporal equity, which is increasingly represented (e.g. in the Stern Review, 
2006) as intertemporal neutrality. 
 
These principles specify the objective of sustainable development. As Anand and 
Sen (1994) note, sustainability is properly viewed as a potential property of development 
policies and the growth of the integrated economy and the environment -- the 
environomy. Once the objectives are stated as above, one can sensibly ask, "Under what 
conditions does pursuit of the objectives logically lead to the provision for a perpetually 
satisfactory environment for human life?" If the parameters of the one's environomic 
model are sufficiently negative about technological change and substitutability between 
natural capital and produced capital is less than 1, pursuit of said environment is futile. 
That is, no set of actions are consistent with perpetuation of satisfactory standards of 
human life. On the other hand, making plausible assumptions about substitutability, even 
without technological change, a "golden rule" path (see Endress et al 2005 and 
Roumasset 2002) of utility is feasible and the three principles guarantee it.  
  
“Positive sustainability” posits sustainable development as neither an objective 
nor a constraint. Rather, it is based on established economic policy analysis but  
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incorporates both natural capital and intergenerational equity. Natural capital can be 
represented by resource use in the aggregate production function (e.g. Toman et. al, 
1993). Intergenerational equity is incorporated into the planner’s objective function by 
setting the planner’s pure rate of time preference equal to zero.  Two necessary 
conditions arise to obtain the optimal, intergenerationally neutral 
consumption/savings/resource depletion profile provided that consumption is feasible: 
 
(1)  MB = c + MUC + MEC        
(2)  MPK = ηg 
 
The first is the so-called Hotelling condition for optimal resource extraction where the 
rule is to extract an additional unit of the resource until the marginal benefit (MB) of 
using the resource is equal to the marginal user cost (MUC) plus the marginal externality 
cost (MEC). The second condition is the Ramsey savings equation, which states that 
produced capital should be accumulated in any given period until its marginal product 
declines to equal the growth rate of consumption in that period times a measure of the 
planner’s aversion to intergenerational inequality, η. Optimal consumption increases 
monotonically and asymptotically to reach the “golden rule” steady state level.
8 
Moreover, adherence to the Hotelling and Ramsey conditions enables the environomy to 
increase its potential limits by moving its PPF outward. As illustrated in Figure 4, 
positive sustainability is attained and win-win efficiency is feasible. 
 
Implementation of win-win environmentalism requires modeling the interlinkages 
and dealing with political impediments to the implied public policies. Policy models of 
global warming containing both climate change and the economic system provide well 
developed -- although not definitive -- examples, inasmuch as they solve for specific 
policy prescriptions.  Sustainability is not a new paradigm but represents an injunction 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, population is held constant. For the case of constant population growth, the RHS of 
equation 2 becomes ηg + n, where n is the population growth rate and g becomes the growth rate of per 
capital consumption. See Roumasset and Endress 1996 and Endress et al. 2005 for further details and an 
extension to renewable resources and pollution.  
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not to give short shrift to intergenerational equity and system interdependence in policy 
analysis. 
 
IV. The Philippines and Hawaii 
 
The Philippine disease 
 
  The Philippine disease is characterized by stagnation owing to fragmentation, 
which coupled with population pressure exerts undue pressure on environmentally fragile 
areas. The formidable presence of rent seeking exemplified by the iron triangle 
exacerbates the disease plaguing the archipelago. The big conglomerates are able to price 
their products high and deter entry because of political connections (e.g. agricultural 
commodities most notably rice and sugar, transport services, electricity and cement in the 
1990s), which exacerbates the situation since these are critical inputs to production. Other 
glaring instances where the iron triangle is at work are the NAIA Terminal 3 fiasco, the 
NFA rice monopoly, the exemption of the sugar industry from land reform and WTO 
concession, and the recent controversy 
9on the Philippine National Broadband  (NBN) 
which involved the highest government officials. 
 
The economic development of the country has been characterized by a premature 
decline of agriculture (Roumasset 2003, Clarete and Roumasset 1987). In the pre-war 
period, the country enjoyed a high level of human capital in terms of educational 
attainment, relatively well established civil, judiciary, and legal institutions. Yet, despite 
having these solid institutions, its development has been substandard (Balisacan and Hill 
                                                 
9 Also known as the NBN/ZTE deal, the controversy involves allegations of corruption primarily involving 
the former Commission on Elections Chairman, the First Gentleman and the President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo regarding the proposed government-managed NBN for the country.  The contract was awarded to 
the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE), a 
telecommunications and networking equipment provider. The issue erupted in the media around August 
2007. It led to the resignation of the COMELEC chairman,  the unseating of incumbent House Speaker, and 
the alleged "kidnapping" of designated National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 




2003). The 70s saw the Philippines in the second tier of the flying geese, then slowly 
slipping down in the 80s and sliding to the tail end during 90s (Table 1).  The economic 
decline is attributed to low investment in rural infrastructure and research and 
development (R&D) and government policies that were biased against agriculture. In the 
1980s the government adopted the policy of protectionism and import-substitution that 
led to premature growth industrialization (Clarete and Roumasset 1987). But even with 
limited trade liberalization, the Philippines has not capitalized on its apparent 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive production (Balisacan and Hill, 2003).   
 
The agriculture sector is a mirror image of the economy, still comprising 14.2% 
of GDP as of 2006, down from 25.6% in 1960. However, domestic policies and 
institutions have restrained efficiency and raised the cost of doing business in agriculture, 
which dulled productivity growth and proved to be detrimental to the country’s 
competitiveness in the global marketplace.  
 
Poverty in the country remains stubbornly high at 11% in 2007 and reduction of 
poverty and malnutrition is slow relative to its neighbors. It is well recognized that 
sustained economic growth at a rate higher than population growth is key to reducing 
poverty. However, the country’s poverty reduction shows muted responses to growth 
(Table 2). A high level of population coupled with low investment translates to declining 
labor productivity throughout the economy. This also implies low levels of investment in 
human capital formation.  More people in poverty result in greater migration into fragile 
environmental areas causing soil erosion and other dimensions of environmental 
degradation (Balisacan and Rola, 2007). The lower resource base in turn exacerbates 
Malthusian pressures on labor productivity. 
 
After the peaks and troughs in its GDP growth, the Philippines posted an average 
of 6% growth starting in 2004. Although this is welcome news, a careful examination of 
the macroeconomic fundamentals reveals that the economy is growing but investment is 
shrinking (See Figure 5). Bocchi (2008) offered three explanations to explain this puzzle. 
First, the public sector cannot boost public investment due to fiscal constraints. Second,  
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the capital-intensive private sector is hesitant to expand investment due to expectations of 
lower return, and the fast-growing service sectors, which include electronics assembly, 
voice-based business process outsourcing (BPO). Third, information and communication 
technology (ICT) would still enjoy increasing profits even without augmenting their 
investments at the rate of GDP growth.  
 
These recent developments are reminiscent of the capital-intensive “finishing 
stage” industrialization (Power and Sicat, 1971; Bautista, Power, and Associates, 1979 ). 
The economy is growing despite the low investment rate due to factors that fuel demand 
and drive supply. As a high-fertility Dutch disease economy, skilled labor migrates out in 
pursuit of greener pastures in industrialized economies abroad. In 2007, remittances 
account for 10% of GDP, invigorating consumption and growth. The remittances and 
transfers can be equivalent to the windfall income generated by the booming oil industry 
in resource curse economies. It spurs growth through consumption but network 
externalities are absent not allowing for investments to follow through. On the supply 
side, the service sector is the one that raises exports. It is thus possible for a country to 
grow even without external economies, but growth where dynamics are missing cannot 
be sustained. 
 
Whether the huge capital inflow from remittances and transfers has indeed caused 
Dutch disease effects is currently being debated. Tuaño-Amador et. al. (2007) and Yue 
(2007) maintain that the country is becoming overly dependent on remittances and may 
have been infected by the disease as indicated by the strengthened peso. On the other 
hand, a more recent study by Tan (2007) contended that the seemingly squeezed 
manufacturing and agricultural exports could not have been a product of Dutch disease 
resulting from flow of remittances. Accordingly, the performances of the two sectors 
have been historically slow long before the surge of remittances and need not be 
explained by Dutch disease but by structural problems that plagued the sector (Tan, 2007).  
 
The argument for and against remittances causing Dutch disease may need further 
empirical and statistical analysis. The fact remains that it adds another distortion to the  
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Philippine economy, and that these sectoral booms may have adverse general equilibrium 
effects on other sectors.  
 
All of these are in accordance with the theory that the Philippines is a fragmented 
economy wherein wages in the favored enclave have risen without conferring substantial 
gains to the unemployed and low-wage workers in the rest of the economy.(Roumasset, 
2003). Fragmentation is the result of three forms of “protection”  
10: 
 
1)  Geographic protection: As an island economy, the Philippines has natural barriers 
to internal integration.  These are exacerbated by inadequate transportation 
infrastructure and misguided transport regulations, esp. shipping (Balisacan 
(1990) and Patalinghug, 1996) As a result of these factors, the growth-enhancing 
effects of trade liberalization are conferred disproportionately to port cities and 
their environs (e.g. Metro Manila, Cebu, and Davao).  Producers in rural areas are 
sheltered from international competition to the detriment of consumers and wage 
earners. 
2)  Economic protection: Despite some progress in trade liberalization, agriculture, 
services and some manufacturing (e.g., steel and some petro-chemicals) remain 
protected both by tariff and non-tariff barriers.  These distortions pull resources 
into the protected enclave both distorting factor prices and artificially increasing 
the real exchange rate.  These forces discriminate against agricultural exports and 
forward linkages into agricultural processing and packaging (e.g., Clarete and 
Roumasset, 1987).  As a result, the agricultural sector remains inward looking and 
insulated from productivity-enhancing competition. 
3)  Political protection: Even as trade barriers and bureaucratic red-tape unnecessarily 
increase the cost of light manufacturing, agricultural processing and packaging, 
and production for export, politically influential entrepreneurs manage to obtain 
exemptions or easy passage through the barriers.  For example, even though the 
poultry lobby has managed to use the WTO apparatus to protect themselves from 
importation of low market-valued chicken parts, McDonalds has succeeded in 
                                                 
10 Drawn from Roumasset 2003.  
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exempting themselves.  Similarly, Coca-Cola and other large companies have 
managed to secure low cost sugar, even as potential small-scale candy makers and 
canned fruit manufacturers are unable to access the same benefit.  And while 
Monsanto and Cargill may be able to accelerate the BPI quarantine procedure and 
other restrictions on importing seeds, farmers that want to experiment with new 
varieties would face great difficulty in doing so.  Relatedly, implementation of 
land reform can be delayed or avoided altogether through political influence.  
 
Fragmentation begets the economy’s stagnation. The diminishing source of 
agricultural productivity growth, limited employment opportunities outside agricultural 
sector, high population growth, slow poverty reduction and the continued existence of 
institutions that are discordant with environmental sustainability are major impediments 
to achieving sustained rural growth.  
 
The curse of paradise: Hawaii 
 
Tourism continues to be the highest contributor to Hawaii’s gross state product 
(Table 3). The sector employs the largest workforce and is a major source of revenue and 
growth of the state’s economy.   Hawaii’s tourism is not only confined to recreation and 
leisure, it also includes military tourism, and second home tourism. Battlefields, other 
war and military landmarks continue to be one of the main attractions for tourists. 
Meanwhile, the tropical weather entices residents of other states and countries to buy a 
second home in Hawaii.  
 
When tourists visit Hawaii, they consume non-traded goods and services (e.g. 
restaurant meals, shopping, heritage and culture) as well as unpriced and underpriced 
environmental amenities (e.g. beaches, mountains, volcanoes, rock formations, tropical 
weather, etc). The tourism boom stimulated demands for these non-traded goods, 
increasing their prices relative to traded, hence appreciation of the exchange rate—a 
Dutch disease effect.  The income received by the service sector is a rough estimation of 
the value of the unpriced environmental amenities (Copeland, 1991).    
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 Population grew rapidly in 1980 at 26% and then declined to 9% in the decadal 
census of 2000. As population growth rate declines, migration increases (Table 4 and 
Figure 6). The pattern of emigration and immigration influence the composition of the 
state’s human capital.  The high cost of living compelled residents to leave the island and 
seek other opportunities in the mainland. Most problematic is the so-called “brain drain” 
where the newly trained and educated young cohort leaves the state. Foreign immigrants 
from Asia replace them altering the composition of the human capital base.  The brain-
drain phenomenon is symptomatic of the resource curse in island economies. Human 
capital, which initially gets its best return in industrialized and service economies, 
migrates into the non-traded sector and then seeks better opportunities in the tourism 
industry. In high-wage-low-fertility Dutch disease economies such as Hawaii, skilled 
labor migrates out and unskilled labor enters the market.   
  
Economic policy in the State of Hawaii may be more intrusive than any other 
State in the Union.  Not only are its citizens more heavily taxed than in most other states 
(Table 5), but a myriad of regulations such as land use laws, water rights restrictions, 
licensing and permit requirements, and labor laws limit the incentives of private 
entrepreneurs to allocate resources to their highest and best use. Economic planning in 
the State of Hawaii has often made use of the concept that government should “pick the 
winners,” i.e. determine which private enterprises would diversify the economy, provide 
employment opportunities, and be competitive with production activities outside of the 
State.  The idea that government can somehow select the winning enterprises combines a 
number of fallacies.  First, government bureaucrats are bound to know less about 
profitability than the private sector.  Second, targeting certain industries for success 
implies that some sort of government subsidies will be involved to stimulate or start up 
the chosen ones. 
  
Subsidies in turn may do more harm than good.  They isolate enterprises from the 
very competition that leads to innovation and productivity gains.  Managerial slack and 
what Harvard economist Harvey Leibenstein calls “x-inefficiency” increase.   Moreover, 
subsidies necessarily involve relative penalties to all non-subsidized enterprises as labor  
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and other factors of production are pulled into the subsidized industry and away from 
other parts of the economy.   
 
Unfortunately, the Rainbow State shows signs of unsustainability. The iron 
triangle is very much visible in Hawaii, as evidenced by broken politics (Roth 2006, 
2008), white elephants
11 (e.g. the Hawaii Convention Center and the proposed $4 billion 
fixed rail system), and the relative neglect of its natural capital. Feral pigs and other 
invasive species are causing soil erosion in Oahu watersheds while feral goats and cattle 
are destroying vegetation in Maui. Bare spots caused by these feral animals result in 
heavy erosion and sediment plumes, exacerbating the decline of coral reefs.  As resources 
decline, congestion and water-scarcity increase, biodiversity is threatened, shorelines are 
hardened, and water quality is threatened by sewage spills. Like other island economies, 
Hawaii’s isolation only makes matters worse, with high transaction and transportation 
costs limiting specialization.  
    
Greedy and Smart Growth 
 
  Experiences of Hawaii and the Philippines exemplify how rent seeking can be a 
form of “greedy growth” (return to Figure 4). Rent seeking pushes the economy and its 
PPF inward.  One particular area where government may grant special favors, allegedly 
to stimulate economic development, is by granting tax exemptions and credits.   It is 
possible to make the case that an omniscient and benevolent despot, unsullied by power 
and not tempted by the lure of political patronage, could indeed use such fiscal incentives 
to stimulate healthy economic development.  For example, some enterprises, by their 
very nature, tend to build skills and create transferable knowledge more than others.  On 
the other hand, other enterprises may produce negative external effects, e.g. by adding to 
congestion and pollution.  Aside from perverse political incentives, it would be possible 
to develop a set of principles regarding which industries should be exempt from 
                                                 
11 White (albino) elephants were once regarded as holy in Thailand and other parts of Asia. Special food 
needs and providing access for worship made keeping a white elephant a very expensive prospect. Today 




particular taxes and which industries should be subject to surtaxes.  Hawaii’s symbolic 
efforts like tax credit for “high-tech” are doomed to fail. Formally called Act 221/215, the 
law stipulates a 100% credit to anonymous investors without neither evidence nor 
guarantee that the investment will generate new jobs or bring in revenues to the state. It 
even allows for almost half of the investment to be spent in places other than in Hawaii. 
In 2006, the use of tax credits soared to $100 million, the highest use to date (Wiles, 
2008). It is ironic that the highest posting occurred in 2006 during a decline of tax 
revenue growth. 
 
In addition to the white-elephant convention centers in Hawaii and the massively 
subsidized fixed rail system for Oahu, the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant
12 and  the 
mercantilistic structuring of the food and cement industries in the Philippines further 
exemplify the high-level of rent-seeking. Other examples are government offices being 
controlled by political appointees, price-controlling politicians that try to put a “cap on 
gas,” picking winners, and creating barriers that increase the cost of doing business (e.g. 
permits). 
 
On the other hand, the "smart growth" movement is very attractive to the behavior 
modifying anti-freedom coalition, protesting growth instead of rent seeking (return to 
Figure 4). An illustrative example can be found in Portland. An architect had a 
conception of a "smart" condominium where residents needed only two cars for every 
three units. The concept was that many residents wouldn’t need cars because the 
condominium was next to a light rail station and the first floor was to be occupied with 
merchants who would supply occupants’ needs. The result was complete disarray. Instead 
of a beautiful condominium and an idyllic courtyard with prolific social intercourse 
between people of high environmental sensibilities, many condo units remained vacant 
and the courtyard virtually abandoned. Business in shops whose owners bet on brisk 
business both from residents and rail riders who would find it convenient to stop and 
shop were disappointed and had to abandon their shops. Eventually, these problems led to 
the abandonment of the whole building, which then became a magnet for squatters.  
                                                 




This outcome came as a surprise to city planners, but could have been anticipated 
from Adam's Smith's dictum that planners and legislators seem to imagine that people 
have no principles of motion other than those supplied by the enlightened planner; they 
cannot understand that people have their own principles of motion to which policy-
makers must accommodate. 
 
Both greedy and smart growth retard economic development and worsen the 
environment. The only difference is smart growth does it with sensibilities
13. Ironically, 
advocates of smart and greedy growth can become strange bedfellows in support of the 
same wasteful project. A prototypical example is fixed rail, which caters to special 
interests (developers, unions, consultants, and construction contractors) and 
simultaneously symbolizes sustainability to true believers. 
 
V.  Transforming the disease into growth 
 
  A number of lessons can be drawn from the experiences of oil-rich countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, even resource-poor China and Mauritius) 
that successfully followed a dual track strategy in effectively transforming the disease 
into growth.  The strategy follows two parallel roads, one that pursues a dynamic market 
economy in the initial stages of reform and the other is a gradual and steady reform of the 
rent-distorted economy (Auty and Pontara 2008). This has the potential of breaking the 
impregnable iron triangle while allowing for the creation of a pro-reform political 
constituency. In island economies, the revenues generated by the tourism industry of 
Hawaii, or the remittances of the Philippine migrants can be channeled into expansion of 
public investments in infrastructure, improvements in human capital, and creation of 
social safety nets, while keeping some in the government coffers for the use of future 
generations. Following Sachs (2007), if revenues from resource earnings are invested in 
                                                 
13 “Sensibilities” as meant by Jane Austen in her famous 1811 novel, Sense and Sensibility. Sensibility is 
defined by Merriam-Webster as refined or excessive sensitiveness in emotion and taste with special 




infrastructure that raises workers’ productivity in both traded and non-traded sectors, then 
a boost in non-resource traded goods can take place (Figure 7a).  
 
  Another way to offset the “Dutch Disease” effects of a resource boom is to tax the 
resource sector and invest in increased productivity of the non-traded sector. As Sachs 
shows (figure 7b), this strategy can result in a depreciation of the countries exchange rate 
and promote exports. In the Philippine case, this suggests that reducing special tax 
exemptions for overseas Filipino workers and investing the increased tax revenue in 
agricultural R&D is worthy of consideration. 
 
Development and specialization 
   
  Positive sustainability can also be attained through development and 
specialization if properly facilitated. Roumasset (2004 and 2008) shows how horizontal 
and vertical specialization increase in the natural course of development as illustrated in 
the evolution of contracts. These two types of specialization opportunities expand as a 
country industrializes.  As farm production intensifies, labor inputs increase, until the last 
stage wherein capital-labor substitution overcomes input intensification.  Labor contracts 
become increasingly specialized, with contracts made on a task-by-task basis.  Hired 
labor therefore stimulates horizontal specialization across tasks. A good illustration of 
vertical and horizontal specialization is found in the institution of piece-rate by teams.
14 
A team is hired to complete a task, such as transplanting, which is easily monitored by ex 
post inspection. The team may produce, for example, a stack of cane stalks that are of 
uniform length and ready for planting. We can think of the task as akin to an intermediate 
good. Thus, a team represents a separate firm with the team manager or a foreman 
serving as its chief executive officer. The latter signs a contract with the sugar grower and 
is liable for any sub par performance.  Vertical specialization also increases. Landowners 
may specialize in land improvements, such as irrigation, and employ tenants who 
specialize in management-intensive labor, who in turn, employ and monitor workers who 
specialize in arduous and more easily supervised tasks.  
                                                 
14 This illustration along with other examples can be found in Roumasset (2007).  
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In agriculture, specialization is limited by the scope of assembly because of non-
convexities being less compact. In this sense, the capacity for specialization in industry 
may be quantitatively greater than that of agriculture but not necessarily qualitatively 
different.  In manufacturing, horizontal specialization of final products are facilitated by 
vertical coordination of giant retailers. Size of the market allows specialization of 
component varieties such that standardization is not needed. This approach is formally 
modeled by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and later updated by Krugman (1979) dubbed as 
“love of variety.” The thirst for variety on the part of the consumers and perfect 
substitution in production results in each firms producing different product. Hence, each 
firm is a monopoly of the particular variety of the product. This process has no natural 
end point in manufacturing, inasmuch as further market growth allows further vertical 
specialization of sub-part production etc. Moreover, vertical coordination facilitates 
horizontal specialization according to diverse preferences and a diversity of costs over 
space and time. 
 
As specialization proceeds, more and more complex patterns of coordination are 
facilitated. A metaphor can be found in the new supermarket economics where 
coordination begets specialization. A vertical coordination is set in motion whereby 
farmers are increasingly linked to specific retailers by means of complex chains that 
transform farm products over space, time, and form. Thus, the process replaces the 
cumbersome and costly method of indirect coordination via inventories. Wholesalers 
coordinate specific farmers with specific retailers with appropriate procurement, quality, 
safety, and timing standards and thereby confer transaction cost advantages on large 
farms. 
 
Specialization and Innovation 
 
  Specialization, development, and innovation is depicted in international trade 
between the developed “North” country and the developing “South” country where a 
specialization ladder occurs. Grossman and Helpman (1991) call this “quality ladder,” 
while Feenstra and Rose (1997) considered this as part of the product’s life cycle. In this  
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setting, North initially specializes in production of and therefore exports of personal 
computers (PC). Eventually, South, who could produce cheaper PCs cloned the 
technology and then eventually drives North’s product out of the market. Meanwhile, 
North innovates newer and more superior machine that will then erodes South’s export 
base. Hence, the cycle goes on.  
 
Specialized knowledge driving innovation is the other side of Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction (Schumpeter 1942). Schumpeter believed that innovation is the propeller of 
economic development but it comes at a price -- creative destruction. Cars replacing 
horse and buggy, compact discs with cassette tapes, book corners superseded by large 
bookstore, which in turn is slowly being displaced by online bookstore, best exemplify 
this notion. Such is the dynamics so that temporary market power can actually be derived 
from innovation. As market environment evolves, the cycle of innovation and creative 




  If necessity is the mother of invention, specialization (learning by doing) is the 
father. Rent-seeking stifles innovation through fragmentation and stagnation. 
Transparency and accountability are the enemies of rent-seeking.  Government policies 
should be framed by the principles of positive sustainability – dynamic efficiency and  
capital formation that allows for standards of living to perpetually increase in pursuit of 
the golden rule level. The role of public policy in sustainable development is gleaned 
from the oldest lesson in economics: don’t dictate, facilitate. As Adam Smith has noted, 
“The man of system (planner) ... is so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own 
ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation ... He seems to 
imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease 
as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that, 
in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of 
its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon 
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Figure 5. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and ratio of gross fixed capital 
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Figure 7. Transforming the disease into growth 
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Table 1. Income and Growth 
                      
      Per Capita Income    Average GDP Growth Rate 
      (PPP constant 2000 Int'l $)         
              
      1975-1977  2003-2005  1975-1977  2003-2005 
                      
East Asia 
(including 
Southeast Asia)  833 4,984    5.83 8.98 
China   603  5,506    4.90 10.17 
              
Southeast Asia           
 Indonesia  1,148  3,289    6.94  5.17 
 Malaysia  3,245  9,320    6.71  5.83 
 Philippines  3,558  4,416    6.66  5.39 
 Thailand  2,082  7,418    8.05  5.97 
 Vietnam  1,032  2,558    3.39  7.86 
              
South Asia   1,099  2,618       
  Bangladesh 983  1,756   1.42  5.83 
 India  1,133  2,864    6.03  8.65 
 Nepal  836  1,366    2.96  3.73 
   Pakistan  1,015  2,014    4.44  6.63 
              
Notes:            
3-year averages centered on the years shown.       
Data for Vietnam starts at 1984; data is average for 1985-1987.   













Table 2. Relatively low poverty elasticities 










Table 3. Hawaii’s Gross State Product 
Gross State Product in 2005:   $53.7 billion 






Total government  22.2 
University 3.1 
Agriculture 3 













Table 4. Statewide Population, (in Thousands) 
   1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Resident Population  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Defacto Population
1  0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Armed Forces  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.04  0.0 
Net Migration  17.0  6.0 2.5 0.3 5.7 -1.0  -7.9 0.6 
Source of basic data: UHERO Economic Information Service 
(http://www.uhero.hawaii.edu).  
Note: Data are 3-year moving average centered at year shown. 
1/ Resident and de facto population are mid-year estimates (July, 1). De facto population 
includes all persons physically present in area, regardless of military status or usual place 






Table 5. State and local tax burdens, 2007. 
Combined State and Local Tax 
Burdens by Rank 


















Total 11.0%      32.7%     
Vermont 14.1%  1  Vermont  35.1%  5  4 
Maine 14.0%  2  Maine  33.9%  10  8 
New York  13.8%  3  New York  37.1%  2  -1 
Rhode 
Island 12.7%  4 
Rhode 
Island 35.1%  6  2 
Ohio 12.4%  5  Ohio  32.4%  18 13 
Hawaii 12.4%  6  Hawaii  33.0% 16  10 
Wisconsin 12.3%  7  Wisconsin  33.3%  13  6 
Connecticut 12.2%  8  Connecticut  38.3%  1  -7 
Nebraska 11.9% 9  Nebraska  31.8%  22  13 
New Jersey  11.6%  10  New Jersey  35.6%  3  -7 
Source: Tax Foundation calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce. 